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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
its agents pay the named owner or co-owner."4 In a situation
where an estate of one co-owner successfully challenged the right of
the other co-owner to take the bonds under the survivorship regula-
tion, the court said: "It seems clear that the federal laws and regula-
tions are not intended to interfere with the positive act of two co-
owners of bonds by which one conveys her interest in them to the
other."49
DORIs R. BRAY
Taxation-Deductibility of Campaign Expenses
Two recent decisions of United States district courts have ques-
tioned the soundness of the general rule that campaign expenses
incurred by a candidate for public office are not deductible in the
computation of federal income tax.' In Maness v. United States,2
"Ii re Hendricksen's Estate, 156 Neb. 463, 476, 56 N.W.2d 711, 719
(1953).
19 d. at 477, 56 N.W.2d at 719.
'This rule is stated in 4 MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION § 25.135 (rev. ed. 1960) and in 1 RABxIN & JOHN oN, FEDERAL
INCOME, GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 3.03(10) (1964). The Treasury
accepts the rule. See Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23(a)-15 (1940), as amended,
T.D. 5196, 1942-2 Cum. BULL. 96, 98; Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23(o)-1 (1940);
Treas. Reg. 111, §§ 29.23(a)-15(b), 29.23(o)-i, 29.23(q)-i (1943); Treas.
Reg. 118, 8§ 39.23(a)-15(f), 39.23(o)-1(f), 39.23(q)-1(a) (1953); Treas.
Reg. § 1.162-15(c) (1) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6435, 1960-1 Cum. BULL.
79; Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(f) (1957); Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.162-
20(b) (1) (i), 29 Fed. Reg. 11190 (1964). See also Statement of Assistant
Commissioner Sugarman Before the Special Committee of the House of
Representatives to Investigate Campaign Expenditures, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1952), reprinted in 5 CCH 1953 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 6029. The
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and the accompanying legislative history
have supported the rule. Section 271 disallows the deduction of bad
debts owed by a political party to a taxpayer; a taxpayer may generally
deduct bad debts under section 166. Section 162(e) clarifies deducti-
bility of lobbying expenses dealt with in Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15(c)(1)
(1958), as amended, T.D. 6435, 1960-1 Cum. BuLL. 79. By partially
changing the rules stated in the regulation it allows some types of
lobbying expenses to be deducted. However, the rule stated in the regulation
that campaign expenses are not deductible was not changed. Section
162(e) (2) (A) provides that the deduction allowed for certain types of
lobbying expenses shall not be construed as allowing the deduction of any
amount incurred in political campaigns. For case law supporting the rule
see McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57 (1944); Mays v. Bowers, 201
F.2d 401 (4th Cir. 1953); Harry D. Moreland, 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1036(1960); George W. Lindsay, 34 B.T.A. 840 (1936); David A. Reed, 13
B.T.A. 513 (1928), revid on other grounds, 34 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1929),
rev'd, 281 U.S. 699 (1930).
2 15 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 217 (M.D. Fla. 1965).
1004 [Vol. 43
NOTES AND COMMENTS
the taxpayer was required by statute3 to pay a qualifying fee and a
political party assessment in order to become a candidate in the party
primary; he also incurred expenses in advertising his candidacy.
Deduction of the qualifying fee and the party assessment was al-
lowed, but was disallowed for the advertising expenses. Daven-
port v. Campbell' involved a statutory qualifying fee and a party
assessment. Both were held to be deductible.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 does not expressly allow or
disallow deduction of campaign expenses incurred by candidates.'
Such deductions have been attempted as taxes,6 losses,7 deprecia-
tion,' business expenses,' and expenses for the production of in-
come."0 The decisions have turned upon the types of expenditures
involved" and the relation of the taxpayers to the public office.' 2
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.031 (1960).
'14 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6004 (N.D. Tex. 1964).
' The only sections of the Code which refer directly to political campaign
expenditures are §§ 162(e) (2) (A) and 271. See note 1 supra.
a"[T]here shall be allowed as a deduction taxes paid or accrued within
the taxable year." Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 1, § 164, 68A Stat. 47. See
Maness v. United States, 15 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 217 (M.D. Fla. 1965).
' "There shall be allowed as a deduction any loss sustained during the
taxable year . . . incurred in a trade or business . . . ." INT. REv. CODE of
1954, § 165. Campaign expenditures have been contended to be analogous to
deductions allowed for worthless securities, losses in the development of new
processes, losses in exploring for natural resources and losses incurred in
negotiating new contracts. See Brief for Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari,
p. 6, McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57 (1944). But in the McDonald
case Mr. Justice Frankfurter rejected the contention in "short shrift." He
reasoned that there was no loss because the taxpayer received exactly what
he paid for: "the opportunity to persuade the electors." McDonald v. Com-
missoner, supra at 61.
' "There shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction a reasonable al-
lowance for the exhaustion... of property used in the trade or business.. ."
INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 167. In the McDonald case the Supreme Court
did not refer to the question of whether the expense was a capital outlay,
but the Court of Appeals said that "an outlay of this sort is in the nature
of a capital item." McDonald v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 400, 401 (3d Cir.
1943) aff'd 323 U.S. 57 (1944). In Mays v. Bowers, 201 F.2d 401 (4th Cir.
1953), Chief Judge Parker refused to allow the authorization of campaign
expenses over the term of office to which the taxpayer was elected.
' "There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade
or business . .. ." INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 162. See McDonald v. Commis-
sioner, 323 U.S. 57 (1944).
" "[T]here shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year-(l) for the production
or collection of income; (2) for the management, conservation, or main-
tenance of property held for the production of income .... " INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 212. See Davenport v. Campbell, 14 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6004(E.D. Tex. 1964).
1 Campaign advertising expenses directly incurred and paid by the
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The Supreme Court disallowed the deduction of a party assess-
ment, not required by statute, and of advertising expenses incurred
by an office holder seeking re-election in McDonald v. Comnis-
sioner."3 Section 162, permitting the deduction of business expenses,
was held inapplicable because (1) the expenses were not incurred in
being a public official but in running for public office, which of itself
is not a trade or business ;14 (Z) the allowance of a business expense
deduction to the office holder seeking re-election could not have been
granted to his opponent, who sought to establish himself in a new
business,15 and thus would introduce discrimination in favor of
candidate have not been allowed as a deduction. See McDonald v. Com-
missioner, 323 U.S. 57 (1944); Mays v. Bowers, 201 F.2d 401 (4th Cir.
1953); Maness v. United States, 15 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 217 (M.D. Fla.
1965); George W. Lindsay, 34 B.T.A. 840 (1936). Political party assess-
ments not required by statute have been allowed as a deduction in Nichols v.
United States, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9823 (N.D. Ga. 1963), vacating 201
F. Supp. 337 (N.D. Ga. 1962), but have been disallowed in the McDonald
and Reed, note 1 supra, cases. Political party assessments required by statute
to be paid to the state were allowed in Davenport when required by statute
to be paid to the party. Filing fees required of candidates by statute were
allowed in Maness and Davenport.
12 None of the cases allow deduction of contributions to the campaign of
another. A candidate seeking re-election stands in a more favorable position
in seeking the deduction of his campaign expenses than does his opponent.
See Davenport v. Campbell, 14 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6004 (1964). But see
McDonald v. Commissioner, supra note 11, at 63. Confusion between the
merits of the claimed deduction by candidates and noncandidates has led to
the overly broad statement that the deduction of campaign expenses is
against public policy. See Dohan, Deditctibility of Non-Business Legal and
Other Professional Expenses, N.Y.U. 17THr INST. N FED. TAX 579, 599, 601
(1958). The public policy argument originated in Charles H. McGlue, 45
B.T.A. 761, 769 (1941). In that case an attorney, not running for office,
attempted the deduction of contributions to a political campaign. His theory
was that the contributions increased his prestige with the elected officials and
that his clients benefited by his preferred position with such officials. The
Board of Tax Appeals disallowed the deduction because it believed that
expenditures made for the purpose of exerting political influence are con-
trary to public policy. The Tax Court opinion in Michael F. McDonald,
1 T.C. 738, 740-41 (1943), relied on McGlue in saying that the deduction of
campaign expenses by a candidate is against public policy. However,
McGlue fails to support the Tax Court. Since the expenditure in McGiue
was against public policy, deduction of it was held to be. In McDonald the
expenditure was not against public policy. Obviously, there is no public
policy against a candidate spending a reasonable sum to approach the
electorate. Therefore the deduction of the expense cannot be. The sub-
sequent opinions rendered in the McDonald case by the court of appeals and
the Supreme Court, although affirming the Tax Court, were not based on the
public policy argument. See McDonald v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 400 (3d
Cir. 1943), aff'd, 323 U.S. 57 (1944).12323 U.S. 57 (1944).
1 Id. at 60.
Expenses paid or incurred in seeking employment or in placing oneself
in a position to begin rendering personal services for compensation are not
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incumbents;1" and (3) the legislative history of section 7701 (a)
(26), declaring public office holding to be a trade or business within
the meaning of section 162, indicates that section 7701 (a) (26)
had nothing to do with campaign expenses.1'
Maness distinguished McDonald as to qualifying fees and party
assessments: in McDonald these expenses were paid directly to the
political party and were not required by statute; in Maness they
were required by statute to be paid to the state. Therefore they were
held to be "taxes" within the general language of section 164 as it
existed in the applicable tax year.'" The "taxes" theory is, however,
of minor importance; an amendment to section 164's has elim-
inated the possible use of this distinction for tax years beginning
after 1963.
The Davenport case indicates that McDonald is controlling
authority only on identical facts. Finding factual differences, deduc-
tion of the qualifying fee and the party assessment was allowed as a
business expense under section 162 and as an expense incurred for
the production of income under section 212. There was no justifiable
indication that had the factual differences been present in McDonald
the deductions would have been allowed in that case.2" In allowing
deductible. See William S. Scull II, 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1483 (1964);
Abraham Teitelbaum, 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 932 (1964); Edward R.
Godfrey, 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1 (1963), aff'd, 335 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1964).
See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(f) (1957); 4 MERTENS, op. cit. supra
note 1, § 25.08.
18 323 U.S. at 63.
" Id. at 62 n.3, citing 1 Hearings on H.R. 7835 Before the Senate Com-
wittee on Finance, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1934).
18 See note 6 supra. The Internal Revenue Service has taken irresolute
views on whether mandatory campaign expenses are taxes. Rev. Rul. 57-345,
1957-2 Cum. BuLL. 132, said that the New Mexico primary filing fee re-
quired of candidates for political office by N.M. STAT. ANN. ch. 3, art. 11,
§ 17 (1953) and to be paid to the state was deductible as a tax. The ruling
was extended in Nichols v. United States, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9823
(N.D. Ga. 1963). In this case the primary filing fee was held to be a
tax even though participation in the primary was not required by statute
and the filing fee was paid to the political party. Rev. Rul. 60-366, 1960-2
Cum. BULL. 63, revoked Rev. Rul. 57-345 and held the North Carolina
primary filing fee, required of candidates for political office by N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 163-120 (1964) nondeductible. The Maness case refused to follow
Rev. Rul. 60-366.
"Revenue Act of 1964, § 207(a), 78 Stat. 40, limited the deduction of
taxes to: state, local, and foreign real property taxes; state and local per-
sonal property taxes; state, local, and foreign income taxes; state and local
general sales taxes; and state and local gasoline taxes. Other taxes may be
deducted under §§ 162 and 212.
-o In Davenport the expenses were required by statute, TEX. STAT. ANN.
arts. 13.07a, 13.08 (Supp. 1964); in McDonald they were required only by
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the business expense deduction, the court rejected the view stated by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in McDonald that a valid distinction exists
between expenses incurred in being a public official and in running
for public office. Adopted were the arguments made by the tax-
payer in McDonald that the distinction would create an unreal
separation as though each type of expenditure had no relation to the
other, and that the taxpayer could not have continued in office with-
out incurring the election expenses.2 ' Emphasis was placed on the
re-election aspect. By seeking re-election the taxpayer attempted
merely to continue his existing business.22
The court responded to the discrimination argument relied upon
in McDonald for disallowance of the business expense deduction
under section 162, by holding that both the taxpayer seeking re-
election and his opponent seeking a new position could deduct these
campaign expenses as being incurred for the production of income
under section 212. The applicability of section 212 to campaign
expenses involves a statutory construction problem: to what extent
must courts be guided by legislative history in interpreting seem-
ingly clear words of a statute ?23
the political party. This distinction does not justify refusal to follow Mc-
Donald because the expenses need only be ordinary and necessary in order
to be deductible under §§ 162 or 212. Neither case denied that the ex-
penses were ordinary and necessary. The mandatory nature of the Daven-
port expenses is relevant to whether the expenses were taxes deductible
under § 164. But the Davenport decision is not based on § 164. In fact,
authority is cited that the expenses were not taxes. Furthermore, the court
pointed out that, unlike McDonald, the taxpayer in Davenport was entitled
to a refund of any part of his assessment not expended by the party to
finance the primary. This fact detracts from, rather than adds to, the view
that the expenses are taxes. Another distinction referred to by the court
is that in Davenport, the assessment would be used locally, whereas in Mc-
Donald it would be used statewide.
1 Brief for Petitioner, pp. 19-20, McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S.
57 (1944).
2 Expenses of continuing or expanding an existing business are de-
ductible. York v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1958); Cornelius
Vanderbilt, Jr., 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 916 (1957).2 The "plain meaning rule" of statutory interpretation is that a court
may not look to the legislative history of an unambiguous statute in order
to give it a different meaning. See Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330
U.S. 485 (1947); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). See
criticism of this rule in 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4502(3d ed. 1943). This rule would support the view that § 212 allows the
deduction of campaign expenses. The McDonald case took the opposite
approach, that the literal words of a statute may be read and relied upon
only when the legislative history is unclear. This approach to statutory
interpretation has found recent approval in Dean Rostow's statement that
"statutes, cases and words have no meaning apart from their contexts.
None at all. As words, from the point of view of verbal analysis, linguistic
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Uncertainty in the scope of the business expense deduction led
to the enactment of section 212. The 1921 position of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue was that campaign expenses of a candidate were
personal, therefore not deductible. 4 Yet the Bureau also declared
that the business expense deduction included "all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred in the production of taxable
income." 5 Higgins v. Commissioner2 6 rejected that view and dis-
allowed deduction for investment management expenses. Sub-
sequent to Higgins the Treasury Department recommended2 7 an
amendment to restore the deduction of expenses paid or incurred in
the production of income. The recommendation was enacted; it now
appears as section 212. Regulations 2 appearing shortly after the
enactment show clearly that the Treasury in proposing and promot-
ing the amendment did not intend to abandon its earlier declared
position that campaign expenses are not deductible. But the intent
of Congress in enacting section 212 is unclear.
In McDonald the Court was equally divided on whether the
section was broad enough to apply to campaign expenses.29 Mr.
Justice Frankfurter believed that it was not:
In short, the act of 1942 [now section 212] in no wise affected
the disallowance of campaign expenses as consistently reflected
by legislative history, court decision, Treasury practice and
Treasury regulations .... Every relevant item of evidence bear-
ing upon the history of this amendment precludes the inference
that the Treasury without intent and the Congress without appre-
ciation opened wide the door for the allowance of campaign ex-
penditures as deductible expenses.30
analysis, or a fortiori, from the point of view of their use in law, they
are meaningless." Panel Discussion, "The Computer in Law, Yes or No?"
in M.U.L.L., Sept. 1964, p. 104.
2" See O.D. 864, 4 Cum. BULL. 211 (1921).
2" See I.T. 2751, XIII-1 Cum. BULL. 43, 44 (1934).
312 U.S. 212 (1941).
1 Hearings on Revenue Revision Before the House Committee on
Ways and Means, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1942); Hearings Before the
Senate Committee on Finance on the Revenue Act of 1942, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. 50 (1942).28 See note 1 supra.
29 Justices Stone, Roberts and Jackson concurred in the opinion of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter that § 212 was merely designed to reverse the result in
Higgins, therefore was inapplicable to the facts in McDonald. Mr. Justice
Rutledge concurred in result only. Justices Reed, Douglas and Murphy joined
in the dissent of Mr. Justice Black to the effect that the language of § 212
was sufficiently broad to allow the deduction of campaign expenses.80 323 U.S. at 62-63.
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It is noteworthy that Justice Frankfurter did not have express sup-
port for his broad generalization in the committee reports on section
212.81
Inferences to be drawn from the committee reports support the
view that section 212 should be broadly applied 2 as suggested by
the dissent of Mr. Justice Black in McDonald and by the Maness
and Davenport cases. This view is supported by arguments that (1)
the literal language of section 212 is broad enough to allow such a
deduction;3 (2) advertising expenses of private businesses are
deductible;4 and that (3) it is, unlike the narrow view, consistent
with the basic policy of income tax law to tax net, not gross,
income.35
The Maness and Davenport cases do not stand alone in abandon-
ing the earlier restrictive interpretation of the scope of section 212
as seen in M11cDonald.3 0 There is a growing feeling that an express
" Justice Frankfurter said that his view was supported by the com-
mittee statement that § 212 is subject to all the limitations that apply to § 162,
except the trade or business requirement. However, the committee state-
ment means only that the expenses must be ordinary and necessary, paid or
incurred in the taxable year and that they must be expenses rather than
capital items. None of these factors were at issue in McDonald.
2 The committee reports listed the expenses excluded from deduction
under § 212 as those which are expended "primarily as a sport, hobby, or
recreation." H.R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1942); S. Rep.
No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1942). Are campaign expenses for
political office analogous?
" This argument is the basis for the Davenport decision. See also Mc-
Donald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57, 67 (1944) (Black, J., dissenting).
For the text of § 212 see note 10 supra.
" The deductibility of advertising expenses is subject to only two limita-
tions. They must be primarily to stimulate current business; otherwise they
must be capitalized and spread over the life of the asset. They must be
ordinary and necessary. See Poletti v. Commissioner, 330 F.2d 818 (8th
Cir. 1964); George K. Herman Chevrolet, Inc., 39 T.C. 846 (1963). The
Maness decision refers to the fact that monies spent in seeking proxies in
an "election" for control of a corporation are deductible. Compare Graham
v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 878 (4th Cir. 1964), and Surasky v. United
States, 325 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1963), with J. Raymond Dyer, 36 T.C. 456
(1961). The Surasky case broadens the scope of § 212 by relaxing the
degree of proximate relationship an expense must have to the production
of income in order to be deductible under § 212. See Surasky v. United
States, supra at 194-95.
" "Taxation on net, not on gross, income has always been the broad
basic policy of our income tax laws .... Congress in its Revenue Act of
1942 [adding section 212] ... indicated in a most forthright manner its
allegiance to the net income tax policy." McDonald v. Commissioner, 323
U.S. 57, 66-67 (1944) (Black, J., dissenting).
" The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 broadened the allowable deductions
under § 212 to include expenses paid or incurred in connection with the
determination, collection or refund of any tax. INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
§ 212(3).
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statutory allowance of a deduction by a candidate for reasonable
campaign expenditures as expenses incurred for the production of
income should be permitted.3 ' However, two decades have passed
since McDonald; apparently the courts are themselves ready to take
action.
BROWN HILL BOSWELL
Torts-Damages-Aggravation of Pre-existing Injuries
On February 11, 1963, while the plaintiff in Lockwood v. Mc-
Caskill' was waiting for a traffic light to change, his automobile was
struck in the rear by defendant's truck. He was unconscious
momentarily and later suffered headaches accompanied by pain in
his neck, back, hips and left leg. Because of this pain he was unable
to return to the operation of his service station until May 1. During
his absence an employee wrecked a customer's car, forcing plaintiff
to pay damages in the amount of 1,200 dollars. Plaintiff, "'basically
.. an insecure person .... a perfectionist .... a worrisome individ-
ual,' "2 brooded about his financial difficulties in meeting payrolls and
other expenses. He had difficulty sleeping because of this worry,
pain, and headaches. On the morning of May 20, more than three
months after the accident, he suffered an attack of amnesia and was
hospitalized until June 15, 1963. During his stay he suffered periods
of confusion and depression.
At the trial plaintiff's psychiatrist testified to the effect that
"the accident and resulting physical injuries would not have caused
amnesia in a person with ordinary susceptibility to worry and in-
secure feelings, but that plaintiff is more than ordinarily prone to
suffer from these mental conditions. ... "' It was further stated
that the
attack of amnesia was induced by a deep sense of insecurity,
that... the injuries he suffered in the accident and the financial
burdens and losses caused by his physical incapacity to work and
" 4 MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 1, § 25A.17. See Diamond, The Shadow
of McDonald, 23 TAxEs 511, 515 (1945); 39 ILL. L. Rnv. 298 (1945).
1262 N.C. 663, 138 S.E.2d 541 (1964).
2 Id. at 666, 138 S.E.2d at 543.
Id. at 670, 138 S.E.2d at 546.
1965]
